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Abstract
The recent Altera case in the US Tax Court (on appeal to the Ninth Circuit) raises interesting
issues in regard to the much-debated topic of whether customary international tax law (CITL)
exists. Altera involved the question whether the cost of employee stock options should be included
in the pool of costs that must be shared under a cost sharing agreement. In Xilinx, the Ninth
Circuit held under a previous version of the regulations that these costs should not be included
because unrelated parties operating at arm’s length would not have agreed to include them.
Treasury then amended the regulation to state specifically that “all” costs includes the cost of stock
options but did not carve out an exception from the arm’s length standard. In Altera, the Tax
Court sitting en banc invalidated the new regulation on the ground that it was inconsistent with the
arm’s length standard (ALS). This article-in-abstract discusses the implications of Altera for the
long-running debate about whether CITL exists and whether it is binding on the United States.
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ALTERA, THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD, AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
1. Introduction: Xilinx and Altera

In Xilinx v. Commissioner (125 TC 37 (2005), aff’d, 598 F.3d 1191 (9 Cir. 2010)), the
Tax Court held that the cost of employee stock options cannot be included in the pool of
costs shared under a cost sharing agreement because unrelated parties would not have
agreed to share theses costs and the ALS takes precedence over the cost sharing
regulations. A panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reversed, arguing that the more specific
cost sharing regulations should override the ALS, and that the omission of stock option
costs would undermine Congressional intent to ensure that all costs are included under the
“commensurate with income” standard of IRC section 482. A storm of criticism over the
court violating the ALS ensued, and the same Ninth Circuit panel vacated its previous
ruling and affirmed the Tax Court.
th

1

Treasury then amended the cost sharing regulations (Treas. Reg. 1.482-7(d)(2)) to require
specifically that the cost of options be included, relying on the commensurate with income
standard. However, Treasury did not carve out an exception to the ALS; instead, it stated
that such a result “is consistent with the arm’s length standard.” In Altera, 145 TC 3
2
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* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. Thank you to Steve Ratner, Kristina
Daugirdas Monica Hakimi and Julian Mortenson for comments on an earlier version.
On the original Ninth Circuit opinion see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx and the Arm's-Length
Standard, 123 Tax Notes (June 8, 2009); 54 Tax Notes Int’l 859 (June 8, 2009).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3) (2015) (“For purposes of this section, IDCs mean all costs, in cash or
in kind (including stock-based compensation, as described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section.”).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d) (2015); see also Compensatory Stock Options Under Section 482, 68
Fed. Reg. 51171-02 (Aug. 26, 2003) (“Treasury and the IRS continue to believe that requiring
stock-based compensation to be taken into account for purposes of QCSAs is consistent with the
legislative intent underlying section 482 and with the arm's length standard (and therefore with the
obligations of the United States under its income tax treaties and with the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines). The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 expressed Congress's intent to
respect cost sharing arrangements as consistent with the commensurate with income standard, and
therefore consistent with the arm's length standard, if and to the extent that the participants' shares
of income “reasonably reflect the actual economic activity undertaken by each.” See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 99-481, at II-638 (1986). The regulations relating to QCSAs implement that legislative
intent by using costs incurred by each controlled participant with respect to the intangible
development as a proxy for actual economic activity undertaken by each, and by requiring each
controlled participant to share these costs in proportion to its anticipated economic benefit from
intangibles developed pursuant to the arrangement. In order for the costs incurred by a participant
to reasonably reflect its actual economic activity, the costs must be determined on a comprehensive
basis. Therefore, in order for a QCSA to reach an arm's length result consistent with legislative
1

2
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(2015), a unanimous Tax Court sitting en banc overturned the new regulation because
Treasury failed to address evidence that unrelated parties would not have agreed to share
the cost of stock options and the ALS (Treas. Reg. 1.482-1) controls.
4

The issue is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and I have joined an amicus brief arguing that
Treasury was entitled to rely on the commensurate with income standard: In the absence
of true comparables it is impossible to prove that the result is inconsistent with the ALS,
and the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard shows that Congress
mandated the inclusion of all costs regardless of what unrelated parties would have done.
The purpose of this article is to raise the broader question of the implications of the
Treasury’s behavior for the question whether CITL exists.
5

2. Does CITL Exist?
6

Customary international law is accepted by the US as a binding part of international law. In
order for customary international law to exist, three elements must be fulfilled: (a) the
widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (State practice); (b)
the requirement that the acts must occur out of a sense of obligation (opinio juris); and (c)
7

intent, the QCSA must reflect all relevant costs, including such critical elements of cost as the cost
of compensating employees for providing services related to the development of the intangibles
pursuant to the QCSA. Treasury and the IRS do not believe that there is any basis for
distinguishing between stock-based compensation and other forms of compensation in this
context.”) (emphasis added).
4
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2015) (“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled
taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
an uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of
the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result).
However, because identical transactions can rarely be located, whether a transaction produces an
arm's length result generally will be determined by reference to the results of comparable
transactions under comparable circumstances. See § 1.482-1(d)(2) (Standard of comparability).”)
(emphasis added).
5
Breif of Amici Curiae Anne Alstott, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, Joshua Blank, Noel
Cunningham, Victor Fleischer, Ari Glogower, David Kamin, Mitchell Kane, Sally Katzen, Edward
Kleinbard, Michael Knoll, Rebecca Kysar, Zachary Liscow, Daniel Shaviro, John Steines, David
Super, Clint Wallace, and George Yin in Support of Appellant, Altera Corporation and
Subsidiaries, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2016 WL 3767014.
6
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations…”).
7
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law:
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
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that the acts are taken by a significant number of States and not rejected by a significant
number of States.
8

In the case of tax law, the first and third elements are relatively easy to prove. There are
over 3,000 bilateral tax treaties covering almost every nation on earth, and they all follow
similar models (the OECD, UN, and US model treaties). As Ash and Marian have shown
recently, about 80% of the words of each tax treaty are identical. Moreover, of all the
articles in the treaty, Article 9 (Associated Enterprises), which mandates the ALS, shows
the greatest level of identity across treaties.
9

10

The harder part is to prove opinio juris, i.e., do states follow the treaties even when they
are not legally bound to do so (e.g., in a non-treaty case)? I have previously argued that the
behavior of the US in certain cases indicates that it believed itself bound by certain
international tax norms even when not legally bound by treaty or otherwise. For example,
the invention of the deemed dividend concept for Foreign Personal Holding Companies in
1937 suggests that the US felt itself bound not to tax a foreign corporation on foreign
source income even when the corporation is 100% controlled by US residents. The
invention of the concept of “tax exempt related party” in the earnings stripping context
(IRC section 163(j), 1989) indicates that the US felt itself bound by an obligation to not
violate the principle of non-discrimination embodied in Article 24 of the treaties, even
though it could have overridden the treaties. And the insistence in the 1988 white paper
that profit split, even though it does not rely on comparables for allocating residuals, is an
“arm’s length return method” suggests the US felt itself bound by the ALS.
11

12

Altera provides an interesting case study that further shows that at least in the US the ALS
is considered binding even in a non-treaty situation, i.e., that it is part of CITL.
13

8

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2), n. 2 (1977).
Elliott Ash & Omri Marian, The Making of International Tax Law: Empirical Evidence from
Natural Language Processing (Nov. 9, 2017) (unpublished paper) (presented at National Tax
Association)
Id.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 498-501
(2004).
On the white paper, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 93--94 (1995).
For an early argument that the ALS is part of CITL see Chantal Thomas, Customary
International Law and State Taxation of Corporate Income: The Case for the Separate Accounting
Method, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 99 (1996).
9
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11
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3. Altera, CITL, and the ALS

Altera involved a cost sharing agreement between Altera, Inc. and its Cayman Islands
subsidiary, and the US does not have a tax treaty with the Cayman Islands. Xilinx, on the
other hand, involved a cost sharing agreement with Xilinx’s subsidiary in Ireland, so that
the US-Ireland tax treaty applied. Thus, when confronted with Xilinx, Treasury could have
distinguished it as a treaty case and amended the 1.482-7 cost sharing regulation any way it
wanted for non-treaty cases. Specifically, Treasury could have relied on the legislative
history of the commensurate with income standard of IRC 482. Congress stated for a costsharing agreement to satisfy the commensurate with income requirement, “the income
allocated among the parties” should “reasonably reflect the actual economic activity
undertaken by each,” meaning that “the cost-sharer would be expected to bear its portion
of all research and development costs.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, at II-638 (1986) (Conf.
Rep., emphasis added).
14

Moreover, Congress also stated that this result should govern regardless of what unrelated
parties would have done at arm’s length, stating that Treasury would not be required to
focus on “industry norms or other unrelated party transactions” if they would not exist in a
particular context (like “related party intangibles transfers”). H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 425
(1985). Congress explained that such transactions rarely if ever occur between unrelated
parties:
A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between related parties is
different from that of unrelated parties.... The problems are particularly acute in the
case of transfers of high-profit potential intangibles.... Industry norms for transfers
to unrelated parties of less profitable intangibles frequently are not realistic
comparables in these cases. Transfers between related parties do not involve the
same risks as transfers to unrelated parties.15

Thus, Treasury could have just stated that the inclusion of the cost of stock options in the
cost sharing pool between related parties is an exception to the ALS because there are no
realistic comparables and precisely because unrelated parties would not have agreed to
share of cost of stock options since the value of the options depends on the performance of
an entity that by definition they do not control (i.e., an unrelated party). The Xilinx
See Rufus Rhoades, The Even More Curious Case of Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner and the
Future of Transfer Pricing, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (March 31, 2010),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/tax-law/b/emerging-issues/archive/2010/03/31/xilinx-v.commissioner-and-the-future-of-transfer-pricing.aspx (“The two regulations are certainly
irreconcilable. Given that, one does wonder why the government did not meet that conflict
between the two regulations head on and state that the "all cost" regulation is a divergence from the
general arm's length standard, but that Treasury is authorized to take that action. That position
may not have carried the day, but it would have been far more difficult for the panel to hold that
Treasury is not authorized to make small in-roads on the arm's length principle than to try to
convince the court that an obvious conflict really did not exist.”).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 424-25 (1986).
14

15

CITE: Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Altera, the Arm’s Length Standard, and Customary International Tax
Law, 38 MJILOPINIOJURIS 1 (2017).
5

38 MJIL OPINIO JURIS 1

outcome, after all, warned the Treasury not to address the ALS risks--precisely the result
reached by the Tax Court in Altera.
Instead, Treasury in a non-treaty context, in which it was not bound by the ALS (which is
for domestic law purposes only a regulatory requirement, since it is not in IRC 482), chose
to stick with the ALS and risk the consequences. Altera shows that it was (arguably) wrong
to do so. But the strong implication is that Treasury believes itself bound by the ALS even
when there is no formal legal requirement to be so bound (i.e., where there is no treaty),
and that is the essence of opinio juris. Thus, I believe Treasury’s behavior indicates that it
believes the ALS is part of CITL, and hence that CITL exists. This, of course, is a very
controversial conclusion, since many commentators doubt the existence of an international
tax regime, and a fortiori of CITL.
16

17

4. Implications: Should Barclays be Revisited?

If CITL exists, and if the ALS is part of it, then, absent a specific contrary statutory
provision, it binds the US as a matter of US law. Most importantly, unlike tax treaties,
which in the US do not apply to the states, CITL would apply to state laws. And in that
case, perhaps the US Supreme Court was wrong in its conclusion in Barclays that
18

19

Compare the reference to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the preamble, see Preamble
to Treas. Reg. 1.482-7(d), with the cost sharing regulation invalidated in Altera, see Altera Corp.
and Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 145 T.C. 91 (2015). The TPGs are not formally binding on the US or
any other country unless they are part of CITL.
For the skeptical view see, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the
“International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 137—8, 166 (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54
TAX LAW REVIEW 261 (2001); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
(2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=302141; Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and
Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89 (2004);
Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555
(2007). For the contrary position see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary on Rosenbloom, 53
TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (2000) (“The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests
mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom states, is “a triumph of
international law… I would argue that the network of 1,500 or more bilateral tax treaties that are
largely similar in policy, and even in language, constitutes an international tax regime, which has
definable principles that underlie it and are common to the treaties”); Yariv Brauner, An
International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 259 n.2 (2013).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
See Thomas, supra note 15, at 111--2 n. 80 (for the majority view). Contra Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); Phillip R.
Trimble, Foreign Policy, Frustrated-Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a New Raid
on the Treasury, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 317 (1984); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966) (for a view that customary law
is not binding on the states).
16

17
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20

formulary apportionment is consistent with the foreign Commerce Clause. If the states are
bound to follow the ALS in dealing with foreign parties, perhaps the water’s edge approach
(applying the ALS to multinationals operating outside the US while using formulary
apportionment for domestic operations) that the states generally adopted despite winning
in Barclays is not just politically prudent but a legal requirement as well.
I have long advocated the overthrow of the ALS, and continue to believe that--at least
where comparables cannot be found--some other solution (like a formula) is necessary.
But until the OECD is persuaded otherwise, the ALS is part of CITL, and the
Xilinx/Altera saga (however the Ninth Circuit decides) shows that this is true from a US
perspective as well.

21

20

Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). In Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Court held that world-wide formulary
apportionment for a US-based multinational did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. In
Barclays, the Court extended this holding to foreign-based multinationals, holding that the foreign
Commerce Clause’s “one voice” requirement did not bar California from imposing worldwide
formulary apportionment on a foreign-based multinational. The Bush Administration had sided
with Barclays, but the Clinton administration sided with California, so that the 1992 election result
may have determined the outcome. However, the Clinton Administration then persuaded
California and other states to switch to the water’s edge approach under which the ALS governs
both US and foreign based multinationals outside the US, thereby providing more evidence that
the ALS may be part of CITL (since after the Barclays result there was no legal impediment for
the states to continue applying formulary apportionment on a worldwide basis since they are not
bound by tax treaties) see Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. 298 (1994) at 328 n.30.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A
Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 WORLD TAX J. 3 (2010).
21
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